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Thomas Hobbes hated metaphors.  He likened them to will-o’-the-wisps 
that lead men away from the path of reason and into a mire of absurdity.1  
Hobbes’s contemporary, John Milton, considered metaphor a form of 
deception.  In Paradise Lost, similes buzz about Lucifer like flies.2 
Professor Magarian’s article Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the 
First Amendment Destabilizes the Second is a sober and cogent critique in 
the skeptical tradition of Hobbes and Milton.3  It takes aim at those judges, 
gun rights activists, and scholars, like the present one, who traffic in First 
Amendment analogs for the Second Amendment.4  Magarian’s primary 
criticism is that we have used First Amendment analogs in a manner that is 
 
 * Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
1. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 65 (A.P. Martinich & Brian Battiste, eds., 2011) 
(“[M]etaphors, and senseless and ambiguous words are like ignes fatui; and reasoning upon them is 
wandering amongst innumerable absurdities; and their end, contention and sedition, or contempt.”). 
2. See STANLEY EUGENE FISH, SURPRISED BY SIN: THE READER IN PARADISE LOST 122, 124 
(1998) (discussing association of metaphor, and rhetoric in general, with duplicity and 
imperfection). 
3. Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the 
Second, 91 TEXAS L. REV. 49 (2012).  As a matter of full disclosure, I read and commented on a 
prior version of Professor Magarian’s article. 
4. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 n.4 (3d Cir. 2010) (calling the First 
Amendment analogs a “natural choice” for the Second Amendment); see generally, Darrell A.H. 
Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 
86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 887 (2011) (discussing the relationship between the First and Second 
Amendments with regard to potential corporate constitutional rights). 
138 Texas Law Review See Also [Vol. 91:137 
 
either too abstract to be analytically sound, or too raw and rigid to be 
doctrinally functional.5  The inference is that the Second Amendment is sui 
generis and self-contained; it will generate, from its own text, context, 
history, and purpose, its own unique set of doctrines.  In the end, these 
Second Amendment doctrines may bear superficial resemblance to free 
speech doctrines, but they do not reflect any deeper structural, historical, or 
ideological similarities between the two Amendments.  To Magarian, free 
speech metaphors for firearms are obfuscations that undermine meaningful 
Second Amendment analysis, and lead only to confusion.6  This is the first 
way in which the First Amendment destabilizes the Second. 
Yet, Magarian is not completely averse to using the First Amendment to 
illuminate the Second.  The second half of Speaking Truth to Firepower uses 
another literary device—the foil7—to argue for a relatively limited Second 
Amendment.  This is not to accuse Magarian of bad faith.8  Instead, I read 
Magarian as offering what he considers the proper use of First Amendment 
argument in Second Amendment cases.  His core contention is that First 
Amendment free speech, either as originally conceived, or as it has 
developed over the past century, eclipses armed violence as the source of 
political dynamism in our nation.9  Speech, rather than the gun, is how 
political change legitimately occurs.  This is the second sense in which 
Magarian contends the First Amendment destabilizes the Second 
Amendment; the ascendancy of freedom of expression has weakened 
freedom to arms as the redoubt of liberty.10 
Magarian’s conclusions concerning the Second Amendment are well-
reasoned, even if one does not agree in all the particulars.  Although he 
writes the article as a critique of existing scholarship, his conclusions are not 
much different from some targets of his criticism.  Numerous authors, 
including this one, have argued that the Court’s Heller and McDonald 
decisions do not adequately account for the prefatory clause of the Second 
Amendment.11  Several have argued that the flexible First Amendment 
 
5. Magarian, supra note 3, at 63, 67. 
6. Id. at 54–58. 
7. A foil is “[a] character whose qualities or actions serve to emphasize those of the protagonist 
(or of some other character) by providing a strong contrast with them.”  CHRIS BALDICK, THE 
OXFORD DICTIONARY OF LITERARY TERMS 132 (3d ed. 2008). 
8. See Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459, 468, 
482 (2010) (providing a definition for bad faith borrowing from another doctrinal area). 
9. Magarian, supra note 3, at 98. 
10. Id. at 96–97. 
11. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Heller, HLR, and Holistic Legal Reasoning, 122 HARV. L. 
REV. 145, 167 (2008) (suggesting that the word “militia” must have a technical meaning different 
from simply “the people”); Miller, supra note 4, at 955 (noting that the Militia Clauses “have not 
been completely swept out of the constitution”). 
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standards of review—at least as they are currently understood—are ill-suited 
to settle difficult Second Amendment questions.12  Many Second 
Amendment scholars (although by no means all) suggest that any 
insurrectionist impulse the Second Amendment may protect is now 
vestigial—if it ever protected such an impulse.13  Magarian’s contribution is 
less his conclusions about the Second Amendment, as it is his novel First 
Amendment arguments that support them.  He makes a strong textual, 
intratextual, and ideological case that the Constitution protects speech as the 
primary, perhaps sole, legitimate method of political change.  In this sense, 
Speaking Truth to Firepower is fresh and powerful. 
Magarian does not commit to a particular methodology (textualism, 
original public meaning, original intent, original expected applications, living 
constitutionalism, common law constitutionalism, etc.) that supports his 
interpretive and normative conclusions.14  This is a common hedge, 
employed by judges and scholars alike, and one cannot fault him too much 
for the evasion.  But methodology does have consequences.  One can argue 
that the Framers of the original Constitution were wary of insurrectionism 
when drafting the Second Amendment; one can argue that no common 
speaker of English in 1791 would have understood an insurrectionist purpose 
in the Second Amendment; or one can say that the experience of the Whiskey 
Rebellion, the Civil War, or domestic unrest in the twentieth century, 
quenched the Second Amendment’s insurrectionist fire.  All three lead to the 
same place—speech trumps guns when it comes to political change—but 
each approach carries with it different implications for future firearm 
adjudication. 
 
12. See, e.g., Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh Amendment 
Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L. J. 852, 930–31 (2013) (discussing the problems of 
using First Amendment standards of scrutiny); Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Amendment Plumbing 
After Heller: Of Standards of Scrutiny, Incorporation, Well-Regulated Militias, and Criminal Street 
Gangs, 41 URB. LAW. 1, 82 (2009) (footnote omitted) (“Seeking guidance from the standards of 
scrutiny under the First Amendment, although advocated by some, encounters serious problems.”). 
13. There are varying discussions of insurrectionism and the Second Amendment, at various 
levels of specificity and detail.  See, e.g.,  Carl T. Bogus, Heller and Insurrectionism, 59 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 25, 256-58 (2008) (arguing both that insurrectionism, to the extent it existed at all, was 
“extinguished by the Civil War”); Joshua Horwitz & Casey Anderson, Taking Gun Rights 
Seriously: The Insurrectionist Idea and Its Consequences, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 496, 502 (2008) 
(describing it as “a gross perversion of the intent of the Framers” to ascribe an insurrectionist 
reading to the Second Amendment). But see David B. Kopel & Christopher C. Little, 
Communitarians, Neorepublicans, and Guns: Assessing the Case for Firearms Prohibition, 56 MD. 
L. REV. 438, 521 (1997) (identifying the right to insurrection in the Second Amendment). 
14. Magarian, supra note 3, at 74 (“I follow an eclectic and normatively indeterminate textualist 
approach to constitutional interpretation, using and defending varied extrinsic interpretive 
aids . . . .”). 
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Magarian is the weakest on the policy and doctrinal implications of his 
critique.  If persuasion trumps coercion in all matters of constitutional 
decision making, how does that normative proposition decide cases?  For 
example, if we accept the proposition that the Constitution maximizes the 
right to expression at the expense of the right to keep and bear arms, does 
that mean that regulations on political speech or hate speech meet 
constitutional muster only when offset by an incremental broadening of the 
right to keep and bear arms?  If a person is denied constitutional protections 
for the political channels for change,15 does that mean that she now possesses 
an increased moral or legal claim to the tools of political violence?  How 
precisely are courts to maintain the balance struck between political 
dynamism through the pen and political dynamism through the sword?  And 
what, if anything, does that dynamic have to say about the more pedestrian 
concerns that preoccupy Heller and McDonald—defense against burglars 
and robbers, rather than malicious government?  On these points, Speaking 
Truth to Firepower, compelling as it is otherwise, has little to say. 
Part I of this Essay responds to Magarian’s central objection to 
analogies between the First and Second Amendments:  that First Amendment 
analogies are used in a manner either too loose to be analytically rigorous, or 
too rigid to be practical.  The Response acknowledges the strength of this 
criticism, and offers a modest defense of the utility of First Amendment 
analogs as framing devices for Second Amendment adjudication. 
Part II of this Essay explores Magarian’s own use of First Amendment 
framing devices for the Second Amendment and explains why the argument 
is effective, even if it is limited to resolving perhaps the least contentious 
issue concerning the scope of the Second Amendment: whether the Second 
Amendment legitimates armed rebellion. 
Part III of this Essay concludes by reviewing Magarian’s treatment of 
the issue of First and Second Amendment differences with respect to 
collective rights.  This Part suggests that Magarian has identified a deeper 
issue of constitutional design and structure that his article does not 
completely pursue, and which could be used to address some of the issues 
that Speaking Truth to Firepower leaves unresolved. 
I. Magarian on the Abuse of First Amendment Analogs: Abstraction and 
Absurdity 
Pro-gun advocacy swarms thick with analogies between speech and 
firearms.  Hate guns?  You must also hate free speech.  Want to license 
someone’s assault rifle?  You probably want to license the Bible.  Such 
 
15. Cf. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (declaring § 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act unconstitutional). 
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appeals are a common rhetorical device, and can be found everywhere from 
blog comment threads16 to the official records of the United States Senate.17  
The United States Supreme Court is not beyond such appeals; Justice Scalia 
leveraged the First Amendment numerous times to declare an individual right 
to keep and bear arms in his Heller opinion.18 
Speaking Truth to Firepower takes on these analogs, whether used by 
judges, advocates, or scholars, and attempts to show how misguided they are.  
Magarian’s criticisms are well-grounded, but tend to undervalue the extent to 
which First Amendment analogs legitimate categoricalization in Second 
Amendment cases.  Further, Magarian’s second criticism, the more 
persuasive of the two, fails to fully appreciate the role that analogs can play 
in identifying institutions that shape both the First and the Second 
Amendments.  Indeed, one of these institutions, the militia, plays a prominent 
role in the third portion of Magarian’s own article, as discussed below. 
Magarian criticizes some writers, including this one, for articulating 
First Amendment analogs at a trivial level of abstraction.19  The First 
Amendment uses categories; the Second Amendment uses categories.  
Neither of these similarities, according to Magarian, tells us very much.20 
Perhaps, but, they do tell us more than we knew before.  The Second 
Amendment is a “vast terra incognita.”21  And it uses terms that are not as 
crystalline as many people think.  “Keep,” “bear,” and “arms” cannot contain 
the full semantic content of the dictionary and still be functional as law.22  
Even if we limit the Amendment to the “operative” clause, these terms are 
 
16. See Scott Wilson, Comment to NJ v. Gun Owners, Again, National Review Online (Sept. 
28, 2011, 11:59 AM) (on file with author) (suggesting that persons cannot be made to get a license 
to buy a book or go to church). 
17. See e.g., Proposals to Reduce Gun Violence: Protecting our Communities While Respecting 
the Second Amendment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human 
Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Charles J. Cooper, 
Partner, Cooper & Kirk, PLLC), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/2-12-13CooperTestimony.pdf 
(comparing the right to keep a firearm in the home as the same as the right to express unpopular 
opinions).  Senator Ted Cruz of Texas, for example, attempted to discredit fellow Senator Diane 
Feinstein’s assault weapons legislation with the largely rhetorical question of what kind of books 
she would license.  See Eyeder Peralta, ‘I Am Not a Sixth Grader’: Sens. Feinstein, Cruz Spar on 
2nd Amendment, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 14 2013), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-
way/2013/03/14/174332925/i-am-not-a-sixth-grader-sens-feinstein-cruz-spar-on-2nd-amendment. 
18. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80, 582, 591, 595, 618, 629 n.27 
(2008) (appealing to free speech or the First Amendment to support various interpretive points). 
19. Magarian, supra note 3, at 67. 
20. Id.; cf. Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (“We are hesitant 
to import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into Second Amendment 
jurisprudence.”). 
21. United States v. Masciandaro,  638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir.  2011). 
22. See Miller, supra note 12, at 896–97. 
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cushioned by other terms, “the right” and “infringed”—terms that require 
construction.23  A threshold issue in construing any constitutional protection 
is to determine what falls within the zone of protection and what falls outside 
that zone.24  To say that the Second Amendment uses categories in the same 
way that the First Amendment does is to say that not all things that ordinary 
English-speakers understand as “speech” are in fact First Amendment speech; 
in the same way that not all things that ordinary English-speakers understand 
as “keep[ing],” or “bear[ing],” or “arms” are Second Amendment 
“keep[ing],” or “bear[ing],” or “arms.”25 
As I’ve written elsewhere, if you consult a dictionary, whether printed 
in 1791 or 2013, “keep” means “have,” “bear” means “carry,” “arm” means 
“weapon.”26  The mistake that many gun-rights activists make is to presume 
that this means that any example of something that meets the semantic sense 
of keep, bear, or arm is protected, and then place the burden on the defendant 
to show that the regulation is compelling, or important, or reasonable.27  But 
only the most zealous free speech advocate suggests that every utterance is 
protected, subject only to some showing of a compelling, important, or 
reasonable reason for the regulation.  Fighting words, obscenity, and libel are 
not First Amendment speech because their incremental contribution to public 
discourse is outweighed by their actual or potential detrimental effects.  This 
a priori judgment is encoded in the very concept of “speech” that the First 
Amendment text is supposed to communicate. 
In this sense, the First Amendment analogy to unprotected “speech” is 
helpful.  It does advance our understanding of the Second Amendment to 
accept that some kinds of dangerous or unusual devices—a vial of anthrax, 
for example—is not, and cannot be, a Second Amendment “arm,” 
irrespective of its semantic meaning, or its utility for self-defense, even if the 
precise method for determining what is in fact a “not-arm,” has yet to fully 
emerge.28  The fact that the Second Amendment text contemplates a yet 
 
23. Id. at 897; cf. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1773 (2004) (observing that one 
approach to the indeterminate nature of the word “speech” in the First Amendment is to note that 
the First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech”). 
24. This is a point that Professor Blocher makes well in Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and 
Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 387 (2009). 
25. See Schauer, supra note 23, at 1771 (discussing theories of what does not count as First 
Amendment speech); U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
26. Miller, supra note 12, at 897. 
27. See Peralta, supra note 17. 
28. One frequently urged approach is that any weapon “in common use” is protected by the 
Second Amendment.  See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 624 (2008).  But, as 
Laurence Tribe, among others have noted, that leads to a severe circularity problem. See Proposals 
to Reduce Gun Violence: Protecting our Communities While Respecting the Second Amendment: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on 
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undefined set of pre-packaged “not-arms” (or “not-bearing” or “not-
keeping”) means at the very least we are working within an analytical frame 
more sturdy and circumscribed than Fourth Amendment “reasonableness,” or 
the glittering tautology of “due process,” or the unmanageably broad concept 
of “self-defense.” 
Further, accepting that in both the First and Second Amendments, plain 
text is not really all that plain is an important concession both as a matter of 
popular constitutionalism and as a matter of constitutional implementation.  
As a matter of popular constitutionalism, the fact that most Americans accept 
that their most cherished constitutional value—free speech—is hemmed in 
by historically- and judicially-constructed extra-textual constraints, helps 
legitimate such extra-textual constraints in the Second Amendment.29  As a 
matter of implementation, First Amendment analogs bolster the case for 
constitutional construction, that is, the development of doctrine designed to 
make the text work as law.30  The history of free expression jurisprudence 
has been to layer non-textual doctrine onto the Amendment to make it 
functional over time.  Few are willing to say that the Republic has abandoned 
a commitment to free expression simply because judges must devise a test to 
determine whether a threat is protected by the First Amendment.31  Appeals 
to the First Amendment—even at the broad level of categoricalism—thus 
help provide cover for Second Amendment decision rules that will inevitably 
depart from the strict grammatical meaning of the Second Amendment’s 
operative terms. 
Magarian also argues that writers searching for First and Second 
Amendment parallels fail fully to appreciate the functional and ideological 
differences between these two Amendments.32  Their lack of discernment 
leads these writers astray.  Either they wind up blundering about in the 
thicket of First Amendment doctrine, looking for an analogous standard of 
 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 13–14 (2013) (statement of Laurence Tribe, Carl M. Loeb University 
Professor, Harvard Law School), http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/2-12-13Tribe 
Testimony.pdf.  If the market is suddenly flooded with vials of anthrax, or machine guns, or short-
barreled shotguns, then suddenly the arm is in common use and becomes constitutional.  See also  
Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms after District of Columbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA.  
L. REV. 349, 381 (2009) (“[A] constitutional rule that uses the presence or absence of particular 
arms in common use as a gauge of the constitutionality of firearms legislation runs a serious risk of 
harmful circularity.”). 
29. See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 8, at 493 (discussing the legitimating function of borrowing 
from one area of law for another). 
30. For more on the distinction between interpretation and construction, see generally Lawrence 
B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2010). 
31. See United States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 478 (6th Cir. 2012) (Sutton, J., dubitante) 
(discussing a test to separate a “true threat” from protected speech). 
32. See Magarian, supra note 3, at 72. 
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review (strict, intermediate, rational, content neutral, viewpoint neutral, 
“time, place, and manner,” etc.) or, worse, they foolishly proclaim that a 
specific regulation on firearms must be constitutionally infirm, because no 
such regulation is permitted on speech.  The result, Magarian implies, are 
arguments that range from the clumsy to the crackpot.  In this section of the 
critique, Speaking Truth to Firepower shines. 
As Magarian explains, a fundamental problem with superimposing First 
Amendment doctrine onto the Second is that the speech/action and 
content/incident distinction in free speech analysis does not neatly map onto 
firearm regulations.33  The First Amendment says you can take a bullhorn 
away from a person because it will wake up the neighbors, but you can’t take 
away the bullhorn because he shouts “the Speaker of the House is a 
Communist.”  If you fashion Second Amendment doctrine along similar 
lines, it leads to the incomprehensible conclusion that the assassin can only 
be disarmed after he aims his gun at the Speaker of the House. 
The problem is amplified, Magarian notes, by the fact that most of the 
traditional forms of scrutiny for speech—strict, intermediate, and rational 
basis—are triggered by a distinction between regulations that target the 
content of the speech, as opposed to those which are content neutral.34  But, 
as Magarian points out, there really is no content-neutral regulation of 
firearms.35  All regulations are of the firearm.  It is meaningful to say that a 
regulation forbidding bullhorns in public parks does not target speech; it is 
nonsense to say that a regulation forbidding firearms in public parks does not 
target guns.36 
Magarian criticizes wooden application of First Amendment doctrine in 
Second Amendment cases.37  His critique is delivered with appropriate 
scholarly reserve, but it is cutting.  To argue that children have a Second 
Amendment right to bring a pistol to school, simply because they have a First 
Amendment right to bring a picture of a pistol to school is risible—
deservedly so.38  Nevertheless, a core and periphery approach to the Second 
Amendment, loosely based upon the First Amendment, is not so easily 
ridiculed, as Magarian concedes.  Despite some objectors,39 this two-step 
 
33. Id. at 55–56. 
34. Id. at 63–65. 
35. Id. at 63–64. 
36. See id. at 64–65. 
37. Id. at 70–71 (calling some of these arguments “ill-conceived” and “reckless”). 
38. Cf. Turner v. Sw. City Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 757, 766 (S.D. Ohio 1999) (rejecting 
plaintiff’s First Amendment argument that prohibitions against bringing “look-alike” guns to school 
covers photographs and thus is overbroad); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 506 (1969) (discussing First Amendment constitutional rights of students). 
39. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting) (rejecting traditional balancing approaches based on the First Amendment); National 
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core and periphery approach has been the dominant method of Second 
Amendment adjudication in the lower courts to date.40 
The problem Magarian identifies is not so much that the core and 
periphery approach comes from the First Amendment, it is that attempts to 
define core Second Amendment values by reference to the First are often 
inapt.  Magarian is correct:  a right to firearms cannot advance autonomy 
interests in the same way, and to the same degree, as speech; if it did, it 
would mean that prisoners—who still possess free speech rights grounded in 
notions of autonomy—would retain a corresponding right to guns.41  
Similarly, Magarian correctly observes that the First Amendment right to 
form a political advocacy organization does not necessarily entail the right to 
form an armed political advocacy organization.42 
But even here, Magarian is perhaps too dismissive of the values that the 
First and Second Amendments may in fact share.  To recognize that the First 
and the Second Amendments share certain values concerning autonomy or 
association is not to suggest they should be treated exactly alike in all 
circumstances.  If anything, the recognition that these rights share certain 
values drives a search for institutional and doctrinal constraints, suited to the 
right and possibly reflected in the constitutional text, that organize these 
values.  So, for instance, one can say that the home is an institution that 
structures our understanding of autonomy.  Or, one can say that a political 
 
Rifle Ass’n v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, No. 11–10959, 2013 WL 
1809749, at *4 (5th Cir. Apr. 30, 2013) (Jones, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en banc) (“[W]e 
should presuppose that the fundamental right to keep and bear arms is not itself subject to interest 
balancing.”) 
40. See, e.g., United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 94 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. 
Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1257 
(D.C. Cir. 2011); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 698 (7th Cir. 2011).  For more on the 
origins of the core and periphery idea, and its application in the First and Second Amendments, see  
Blocher, supra  note 24, at 394–95, and Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and 
Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 976 (2009). 
41. See Magarian, supra note 3, at 67 (“[N]either human autonomy nor government excess 
matters in a vacuum; we value distinctive sorts of autonomy differently in various contexts, and we 
trust government in varying degrees to regulate different kinds of behavior.”); Joseph Blocher, 
Second Things First: What Free Speech Can and Can’t Say About Guns, 91 TEXAS L. REV. SEE 
ALSO 37, 40–41 (2012). 
42. Magarian criticizes my exploration of the ideological similarities between the monopoly on 
the tools of violence and the monopoly on political speech.  Magarian, supra note 3, at 67, n.87.  
But my discussion in that Article is mostly descriptive of what the Court has been doing, and 
predictive of where it could be going.  See Miller, supra note 4, at 904.  It is not a statement of what 
the Court should do.  I have argued elsewhere that insurrection can only be used as a legal value in 
the sense that Heller uses it—to sustain the proposition that universal citizen disarmament in the 
home is constitutionally invalid.  Arguments that go beyond that bare minimum are primarily 
arguments from politics, morality, or from brute force, but not arguments from law in any positivist 
sense of the word.  See Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1313 (2009). 
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party or advocacy organization is an institution that structures our 
understanding of freedom of association, freedom of expression, or the right 
to petition the government.  Certain constitutional values may converge in 
some of these institutions.  For example, First Amendment values of 
autonomy and association, Second Amendment values of self-defense, and 
Fourth Amendment values of privacy, tend to converge in some extra-textual 
constitutional concept we call the “home.”43  But that convergence is not an 
argument against analogical reasoning, as much as it is an argument for 
recognizing that an institution exists, that it exerts a force that shapes the 
constitutional right under consideration, and that such shaping must be 
harmonized with other constitutional values, tradition, and text.  Without 
such an analytical inquiry, the features of these institutions and values, what 
Laurence Tribe has described as the “invisible constitution,” may remain 
hidden.44 
II. Magarian on the Use of First Amendment Analogs: Foiling the Second 
Amendment 
Although Magarian takes many of us to task for insufficiently rigorous 
use of First Amendment analogs, Magarian does not believe the First 
Amendment is useless for Second Amendment construction.  Instead, 
Magarian suggests that it is through contrast that the First Amendment brings 
the Second into relief.  For Magarian, the First and Second Amendments are 
foils, and whether through original intention, common law development,  
original public understanding, or the “eclectic” approach of Magarian, the 
First Amendment has displaced the Second with respect to political 
dynamism. 
Speaking Truth to Firepower marshals strong arguments for the First 
Amendment’s foiling of the Second Amendment.  Textually, Magarian notes 
that the Second Amendment, unlike the First, contains a prefatory clause 
concerning the militia and a free state.45  This textual difference, according to 
Magarian, supports a distinction between the First Amendment’s more 
individualistic construction and the Second Amendment’s “collective” one.46  
Doctrinally, Magarian notes that the half-century of expanding protection for 
free expression—even to protecting advocacy of violence in Brandenburg v. 
Ohio—simply cannot be paired with equal protections to the tools for 
 
43. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (recognizing that “the interior of 
homes [is] the prototypical . . . area of protected privacy”). 
44. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE CONSTITUTION 2 , 156 (2008) (identifying the 
home as part of the “invisible constitution”). 
45. U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
state . . . .”). 
46. Magarian, supra note 3, at 85. 
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violence.47  As Magarian succinctly puts it: “We cannot have both First 
Amendment dynamism and Second Amendment insurrectionism . . .  we 
have made our choice [for the First Amendment].”48  Magarian also makes a 
few nods towards, perhaps, a historical understanding that the Second 
Amendment does not protect insurrection.49 
Magarian seems unwilling to commit himself to a certain methodology 
for his conclusions about the scope of the Second Amendment right.  This is 
a familiar peccadillo of scholars (including this one), advocates, and judges.  
Nevertheless, it matters.  An argument that freedom of speech displaces arms 
as the mechanism for political dynamism is far more convincing if one 
understands the value of insurrection as experienced in the American Civil 
War, rather than in the American War of Independence.  And understanding 
that the American Civil War has as much to say about the Second 
Amendment as the American War of Independence requires some 
methodology that accepts the Constitution can change over time, whether one 
labels that change “framework originalism,” or “living constitutionalism,” or 
“common law constitutionalism,” or something else. 
For all of Magarian’s strong points that the First Amendment is a foil to 
the Second, his argument is trained on a relatively narrow proposition—that 
the Second Amendment cannot be read to legitimate open armed rebellion.  
If, as Jack Balkin has observed, the purpose of a constitution—any 
constitution—is “to make politics possible,”50 then this is not an earth-
shattering proposition.  To say that the Constitution commits the Republic to 
political dynamism only through free expression is something—it helps 
justify why Heller disclaims an individual right to own an M-16 rifle or an 
aircraft carrier51—but it does not go much further than that. 
Magarian’s foiling the right to keep and bear arms with speech also 
raises some conceptual problems.  If free speech is the primary mechanism 
for political dynamism—if the Skokie marchers cannot carry rifles with them 
because they have the First Amendment on their side52—then what happens 
when that expression is limited through regulation?  Is Magarian’s argument 
that dynamism through expression and dynamism through threats of violence 
 
47. Id. at 94. 
48. Id. at 53. 
49. Id. at 97 (discussing historical examples of insurrection as sapping the Second Amendment 
of insurrectionary meaning). 
50. Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Hardball and Constitutional Crises, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
579, 592 (2008). 
51. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008) (discussing military-type 
weapons that can be banned). 
52. Cf. Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978) (striking down various regulations 
restricting Nazis from marching in Skokie, Illinois). 
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are zero-sum propositions, and that any diminution of the one must be offset 
with a corresponding increase of the other?  Could it really be that if legal 
protections for minorities to express themselves through the franchise are 
curtailed, for example, that they acquire an increased moral—even 
constitutional—right to achieve political dynamism through force?53 
Further, Magarian’s free speech foil doesn’t offer a strong account of 
what a constitutional commitment to free speech means when the potential 
antagonist isn’t a criminal government, but just a criminal.  Here, Magarian’s 
argument seems to sputter.  It is unclear what the First Amendment foil 
means for the woman who says that she should be able to obtain a firearm for 
home defense free from any license requirement whatsoever.  Magarian 
could be saying that the constitutional commitment to change through free 
expression includes a broader commitment to rational deliberation and a 
well-ordered society.54  In that case, such a commitment would supersede 
any claims the woman may have to unfettered access to a firearm.  Magarian 
could be saying that licensing firearms is the legal mechanism by which the 
constitutional commitment to political dynamism through speech is 
maintained.  In other words, Magarian could be suggesting that if arms are 
too freely available, even for personal self-defense, they are either apt to fall 
in the hands of those who are committed only to violent political dynamism, 
or their omnipresence frustrates peaceful and orderly political change by 
creating a climate in which violent political activity becomes the first rather 
than the last resort.55  Licensing of firearms is therefore necessary to 
maintain speech’s predominance in political dynamism.  Or Magarian could 
be saying none of these things.  It will be interesting to see if he pursues the 
implications of his thesis further.  Speaking Truth to Firepower undoubtedly 
possesses significant conceptual punch; it’s just that it is loosed against a 
relatively easy target. 
III. Magarian and the Once and Future Militia Clause 
Perhaps the most provocative, and under-explored, aspect of Speaking 
Truth to Firepower is its treatment of how the First Amendment and Second 
 
53. Cf. New Black Panthers Back at Philly Voting Site, FOX NEWS, Nov. 6, 2012, 
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/11/06/new-black-panthers-back-at-philly-voting-site/ 
(discussing private citizen dressed in a “trademark black beret, combat-style uniform and heavy 
boots” acting as a poll watcher). 
54. See David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L. 
REV. 334, 334–35, 354–60 (1991) (discussing the justification for free expression by reference to a 
“persuasion principle”). 
55. See Adam Winkler, Scrutinizing the Second Amendment, 105 MICH. L. REV. 683, 704 
(2007) (suggesting that too many arms, or too dangerous of arms, makes democratic deliberation 
too difficult); see also Bogus, supra note 13, at 257 (noting that a problem with insurrectionist 
theories is that, for some, tyranny is not “a future prospect, but a present reality”). 
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Amendment diverge with respect to their understanding of collective and 
individual rights.  Magarian expertly lays out the various alternatives the 
prefatory clause must have in Second Amendment construction.  He makes a 
compelling argument that the Militia Clause, even after Heller, must exert 
some textual control over how the individual right to keep and bear arms is 
construed.56  Magarian’s primary point is that the Second Amendment cannot 
protect individual rights nearly to the degree that the First Amendment does, 
because the Second Amendment, unlike the First, states a collective purpose 
for the right to keep and bear arms.57  Magarian does not say that the right is 
solely collective, a position that he concedes has been vanquished by Heller 
and McDonald.58  Instead, Magarian uses the Militia Clause to articulate a 
difference between political dynamism through speech and political 
dynamism through violence.  The former is protected and the latter cannot 
be.  This is a strong textual move.  But Magarian’s insights about the Militia 
Clause could go further. 
Magarian centers his piece on the destabilizing effect of the First 
Amendment on the Second.  But, in fact, the most destabilizing effects on the 
Second Amendment don’t actually come from the First Amendment; they 
come from Heller and McDonald themselves.  Heller and McDonald 
codified two conceptual revolutions in Second Amendment jurisprudence:  
first, the migration of self-defense as a legal concept away from the common 
law, the Ninth Amendment, or the concept of due process,59 to the Second 
Amendment; and second, the delegitimation of the organized militia as an 
institution that structures the right to keep and bear arms.  As a matter of 
Reconstruction history in particular, there is a strong reason to believe that 
this destabilization of the foundations of the Second Amendment are 
historically supportable.  Reconstruction legislators were profoundly 
distrustful that former Confederate states would accord to the Freedmen 
equal access to self-defense protections; Reconstruction legislators often 
spoke imprecisely about a right to arms and a right to self-defense; and 
Reconstruction legislators were also actively, and rightly, skeptical that the 
former Confederate state militias, once reconstituted, would protect the 
Freedmen. 
 
56. Magarian, supra note 3, at 84–87. 
57. Id. at 85–86. 
58. Id. at 78–79. 
59. See Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History, 2010 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13, 24 (discussing self-defense and its relationship to natural law, common 
law, and the Ninth Amendment); see also Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 56 (1996) (plurality 
opinion) (suggesting that  jury must be able to hear self-defense evidence as a matter of fundamental 
due process). 
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But whatever the historical legitimacy of this conceptual revolution, it 
leaves the Second Amendment in disarray.  Whereas at one time the Militia 
Clause could structure answers to questions like:  Is a short-barreled shotgun 
an “arm” that the Second Amendment protects?60  Or, Can I form a socialist 
gun club and march through the largest city in Illinois?61  Now, after 
Reconstruction, Heller, and McDonald, these questions become much more 
problematic, because the “degree of fit between the prefatory clause and the 
protected right” have loosened.62  Instead, the courts are left with a 
hodgepodge of history, conventions, common law, and policy considerations 
from which to structure a wide-open claim to “keep and bear arms” for 
“confrontation.”63 
What Magarian’s article suggests, but does not completely explore, is 
that the prefatory clause may not only exert an interpretive gravity on the 
narrow question of political dynamism (persuasion or violence), but may 
exert interpretive gravity on broader questions of Second Amendment 
construction and scope.  For example, it may be possible to say that, because 
the Militia Clause, including its signature idea of “well-regulated,” is still in 
the Second Amendment, certain types of behaviors—policing one’s 
neighborhood as a self-appointed community watchman, for example—are 
not assertions of totally individual rights.  A posse of self-appointed 
community watchmen looks far more like a militia than a simple group of 
private citizens.  A person who takes it upon himself to exercise deadly force 
to prevent a crime is not necessarily asserting solely individual rights either.  
Individuals who apprehend or harm criminals in public places, even in self-
defense, have long been understood to be asserting a power uniquely 
belonging to the sovereign.64  And if that is true, then the residual presence of 
Second Amendment references to a “well regulated Militia” may help 
explain, textually, why governments may still have something to say about 
 
60. See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939). 
61. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264 (1886). 
62. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
63. See id. at 592. 
64. See Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567–68 
(1903) (discussing how homicide, even in self-defense, was a crime unless committed in exercise of 
the kings writ); David McCord & Sandra K. Lyons, Moral Reasoning and the Criminal Law: The 
Example of Self-Defense, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV.  97, 138 (1992) (noting that the “kings of England 
. . . adopted a blanket rule that all homicides were criminal but that self-defense was a factor which 
might result in granting of a royal pardon”); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice 
Aforethought, 43 YALE L. J. 537, 539 (1934) (“According to the ancient common law of England, 
only those homicides were innocent which were caused in the enforcement of justice. . .”).  See also 
2 FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I  479 (2d ed. 1899) (noting that at English common law “the sphere 
of justifiable homicide was very narrow, and the cases which fell within it . . . would have been 
regarded less as cases of legitimate self-defence [sic] than as executions”). 
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when, under what circumstances, and with what weapons, such an awesome 
power may be exercised. 
